Many psychological scientists and behavioral neuroscientists affirm that “emotion” influences thinking, decision-making, actions, social relationships, well-being, and physical and mental health. Yet there is no consensus on a definition of the word “emotion,” and the present data suggest that it cannot be defined as a unitary concept. Theorists and researchers attribute quite different yet heuristic meanings to “emotion.” They show considerable agreement about emotion activation, functions, and regulation. The central goal of this article is to alert researchers, students, and other (...) consumers of “emotion” research to the multiple meanings or aspects that distinguished scientists attribute to ”emotion,” increase appreciation of its interesting and challenging complexity, and sharpen perspectives on “emotion” and the associated body of literature that is of critical significance to science and society. (shrink)

This article clarifies my current and seemingly ever-changing position on issues relating to emotions. The position derives from my differential emotions theory and it changes with new empirical findings and with insights from my own and others’ thinking and writing. The theory distinguishes between first-order emotions and emotion schemas. For example, it proposes that first-order negative emotions are attributable mainly to infants and young children in distress and to older individuals in emergency or highly challenging situations. Emotion schemas are defined (...) as emotion feelings interacting with cognition in motivating the decision making and actions of everyday life. (shrink)

This article suggests a way to circumvent some of the problems that follow from the lack of consensus on a definition of emotion (Izard, 2010; Kleinginna & Kleinginna, 1981) and emotion regulation (Cole, Martin, & Dennis, 2004) by adopting a conceptual framework based on discrete emotions theory and focusing on specific emotions. Discrete emotions theories assume that neural, affective, and cognitive processes differ across specific emotions and that each emotion has particular motivational and regulatory functions. Thus, efforts at regulation should (...) target the specific dysregulated emotions. The positive effects of emotion regulation are more likely to be optimized when they result from or lead to emotion utilization—the constructive use of the energy of emotion arousal. Effective processes for regulation differ for basic emotions and emotion schemas. This article identifies neural systems that facilitate emotion experiences and emotion regulation processes. It considers the implications of the developmental change from basic emotions to emotion schemas, and also briefly discusses the effects of interventions on changes in emotion knowledge, emotion regulation, and social and emotional competence. (shrink)

Many emotion researchers would probably agree that at least some aspects of discrete emotions are evolutionarily conserved (e.g., the sensation/feeling component cannot be learned). Such agreement probably extends to the notion that aspects of emotions emerge in ontogeny as a function of developmental, learning, and cultural processes. Determining when and under what circumstances they emerge seems largely a matter for empirical research, though theories differ in their predictions and in the way they describe the relevant emotional-, cognitive-, and neuro-developmental processes.

I am very appreciative of those who wrote comments on my article. They raised some interesting and some quite challenging questions. Their responses seem quite in synchrony with my focus and intent—to reveal some problems that we need to address in advancing emotion science. The authors of the commentaries reflected some of the same sort of differences among themselves as I found among the emotion scientists whom I surveyed in search of a definition of emotion. Like the emotion scientists who (...) responded to my survey, most of the authors of the commentaries were generally in agreement on the significance of research in the emotion domain but not in agreement on the meaning of the term emotion. I briefly discuss the noteworthy question (raised in one of the commentaries) as to whether and when discrete emotion concepts might someday share the same fate as the general term emotion and disappear from emotion science. (shrink)

Carpendale & Lewis's (C&L's) interesting and insightful article did not integrate several potentially useful notions from emotion theory and research into their explanatory framework. I propose that emotions are indigenous elements of mind and that children's understanding of them is fundamental to their understanding of the mental life of self and others, understandings critical to the development of social and emotional competence.

Lewis makes a strong case for the interdependence and integration of emotion and cognitive processes. Yet, these processes exhibit considerable independence in early life, as well as in certain psychopathological conditions, suggesting that the capacity for their integration emerges as a function of development. In some circumstances, the concept of highly interactive emotion and cognitive systems seems a viable alternative hypothesis to the idea of systems integration.

I agree with Williams that evolutionary theory provides the best account of the pain expression. We may disagree as to whether pain has an emotional dimension or includes discrete basic emotions as integral components. I interpret basic emotion expressions that occur contemporaneously with pain expression as representing separate but highly interactive systems, each with distinct adaptive functions.

Block's target article makes a significant contribution toward sorting the neural bases of phenomenal consciousness from the neural systems that underlie cognitive access to it. However, data from developmental science suggest that cognitive access may be only one of several ways to access phenomenology. These data may also have implications for the visual-cognitive phenomena that Block uses to support his case.

Vigil's socio-relational framework of sex differences in emotion-expressive behavior has a number of interesting aspects, especially the principal concepts of reciprocity potential and perceived attractiveness and trustworthiness. These are attractive and potentially heuristic ideas. However, some of his arguments and claims are not well grounded in research on early development. Three- to five-year-old children did not show the sex differences in emotion-expressive behavior discussed in the target article. Our data suggest that Vigil may have underestimated the roles of epigenetic and (...) cultural factors in shaping emotion-expressive behavior. (shrink)

Juslin & Vll (J&V) propose a theoretical framework of how music may evoke an emotional response. This commentary presents results from a pilot study that employed young children as participants, and measured musically induced emotions through facial expressions. Preliminary findings support certain aspects of the proposed theoretical framework. The implications of these findings on future research employing the proposed framework are discussed.

A substantial body of theoretical literature testifies to the evolutionary functions of emotions. Relatively little has been written about their developmental functions. This article discusses the developmental functions of emotions from the perspective of differential emotions theory (DET; Izard, 1977, 1991). According to DET, although all the emotions retain their adaptive and motivational functions across the lifespan, different sets of emotions may become relatively more prominent in the different stages of life as they serve stage-related developmental processes. In the first (...) section, we present a brief overview of relevant aspects of the theory. In the second section, we discuss how emotions play a central role in helping the individual achieve developmental milestones and tasks during four major periods of life: Infancy, toddler through preschool years, middle to late childhood, and adolescence. The underlying thesis of this article is that emotions play a central role in stimulating social cognitive attainments at each stage of development. (shrink)

A comparison of the literatures on how infants represent generic object classes, gender and race information in faces, and emotional expressions reveals both common and distinctive developments in the three domains. In addition, the review indicates that some very basic questions remain to be answered regarding how infants represent facial displays of emotion, including (a) whether infants form category representations for discrete classes of emotion, (b) when and how such representations come to incorporate affective meaning, (c) the developmental trajectory for (...) representation of emotional expression at different levels of inclusiveness (i.e., from broad to narrow or narrow to broad?), and (d) whether there is superior discrimination ability operating within more frequently experienced emotion categories. (shrink)

A comparison of the literatures on how infants represent generic object classes, gender and race information in faces, and emotional expressions reveals both common and distinctive developments in the three domains. In addition, the review indicates that some very basic questions remain to be answered regarding how infants represent facial displays of emotion, including (a) whether infants form category representations for discrete classes of emotion, (b) when and how such representations come to incorporate affective meaning, (c) the developmental trajectory for (...) representation of emotional expression at different levels of inclusiveness (i.e., from broad to narrow or narrow to broad?), and (d) whether there is superior discrimination ability operating within more frequently experienced emotion categories. (shrink)

The aim of our themed symposium is to explore the limits and possibilities of corporate reputation for enabling corporate accountability. We articulate three perspectives on corporate accountability. The communicative perspective equates accountability with disclosure and stakeholder engagement. The phenomenological perspective focuses on stakeholder expectations and reputation management. The consequential perspective focuses on effects/consequences. We then examine how corporate accountability is understood, how it relates to ideals, mission, and purpose, alternative pathways to corporate accountability, reputational consequences, and the role algorithms play (...) in relationships between corporate reputation and accountability. Using a multitude of organizational contexts, these papers advance our understanding of how corporate reputation can be used as a mechanism for creating greater corporate accountability, and for identifying alternative pathways when corporate reputation fails to do so. (shrink)

Mazur & Booth present an intriguing model of the relationship between circulating testosterone levels and dominance behaviour in man, but their review of studies on testosterone–behaviour relationships in man is selective. Much of the evidence they cite is correlational in nature. Placebo-controlled manipulations of testosterone levels are required to test their hypothesis that dominance levels are testosterone-dependent in man. The changes in testosterone level that follow behavioural experience may be a consequence of stress. Testosterone levels in man are determined by (...) a wide variety of factors, and a multivariate approach is required. (shrink)

In this paper William Carroll argues that the alleged conflict between creation and science has its origin in a mistaken comprehension of the meaning of “creation”and the extent of explication that natural sciences can offer. Carroll explains that creation, a metaphysical and theological notion, affirms that everything which exists depends on one single cause which is God. But, on the other side, the object of study of natural sciences is the realm of changing things. Whereas creation speaks to (...) the cause of existence itself, evolutionary biology, cosmology and other natural sciences focus on phenomena subject to change.In contrast, creation should not be understood as the change from nothingness to something, but as a theological and metaphysical dependence in the order of being. This does not mean, however, that the theological and metaphysical approaches are incompatible with those of natural sciences. (shrink)

Cornell College in Mount Vernon, Iowa, has established a new interdisciplinary program in science and religion. One of the features of this program is an undergraduate major in science and religion that requires substantial course work in at least one of the natural sciences as well as course work in philosophy, religion, and history. As a result of a grant from the John Templeton Foundation, Cornell College will offer a special course, God and Physics: From Aquinas to Quantum Mechanics (April (...) 1998), and will sponsor an international symposium on creation and contemporary cosmology (April 1999). Opportunities exist for interested scholars to come to Cornell as Templeton Visiting Fellows in order to participate in these activities. (shrink)

Much second language acquisition (SLA) research confuses the representational and the developmental problems of language acquisition, assuming that attributes of a property theory will explain the transitions between the stages of a psychogrammar, or that induction will explain the properties of the representational systems which encode language. I argue that Principles and Parameter-setting theory deals only with the representational problem, and that induction must play a role in explaining the developmental problem. The conclusion is that both Epstein et al. and (...) the papers they criticize are right; they are just not right about the same issues. (shrink)

The objective of this study was to take a closer look at defense-related expenses for medical malpractice cases over time. We conducted a retrospective review of medical malpractice claims reported to the Physician Insurers Association of America's Data Sharing Project with a closing date between January 1, 1985 and December 31, 2008. On average a medical malpractice claim costs more than $27,000 to defend. Claims that go to trial are much more costly to defend than are those that are dropped, (...) withdrawn, or dismissed. However, since the overwhelming majority of claims are dropped, withdrawn, or dismissed, the total amount spent to defend them surpasses that spent on claims that go to trial. Defense attorney expenses account for the majority of defense-related expenses (74%), while expert witness expenses and other expenses split the remaining 26%. A strong association was also found between the average indemnity payment and the amount it costs to defend individual claims by specialty. Our study found that defense-related expenses for medical malpractice claims are not an insignificant cost. As state and federal governments debate how to repair the malpractice system, addressing the high cost of defending claims should not be ignored. (shrink)

Whenever health care reform is debated, the state of the medical professional liability system in the United States re-emerges as an issue of importance. What exactly is broken with the MPL system and what the implications are is a point of contention among different stakeholder groups. Recent data demonstrate that medical liability premiums have been improving in recent years and the majority of premiums remained flat in 2010. General agreement still exists, however, that medical professional liability insurance premiums have become (...) unaffordable for many physicians, and coverage has become less available, especially for certain medical specialties and in specific areas of the country.Multiple factors go into the determination of medical professional liability insurance premiums including return on investments, reinsurance costs, claims frequency, average amount paid out on malpractice claims, defense expenses, and administrative costs such as underwriting expense. (shrink)

Throughout the Old Testament, the stories, laws, and songs not only teach a way of life that requires individuals to be moral, but they demonstrate how. In biblical studies, character ethics has been one of the fastest-growing areas of interest. Whereas ethics usually studies rules of behavior, character ethics focuses on how people are formed to be moral agents in the world. This book presents the most up-to-date academic work in Old Testament character ethics, covering topics throughout the Torah, the (...) Prophets, and the Writings, in addition to the use of the Bible in the modern world. In addition to Carroll and Lapsley, contributors are Denise M. Ackermann, Cheryl B. Anderson, Samuel E. Balentine, William P. Brown, Walter Brueggemann, Thomas B. Dozeman, Bob Ekblad, Jose Rafael Escobar R., Theodore Hiebert, Kathleen O'Connor, Dennis T. Olson, J. David Pleins, Luis R. Rivera Rodriguez, J. J. M. Roberts, and Daniel L. Smith-Christopher. (shrink)